Attempts to solve it provoked the great revolution from which came the republic of the United States. This revolution was even more momentous than the French Revolution. Not only did it determine the form of the political institutions of the greater part of the two continents of America, but it was itself also in large measure the cause of the French Revolution. Royalist France was aflame with eagerness for republican principles, as applied in America, to the hurt of a hated rival in Europe. These principles, however, would not remain on the other side of the ocean from 
Failure, far-reaching and tragic, was the result of the first attempt to lead two widely separated sections of the British peoples to share common responsibilities and burdens. The defect was chiefly in tact and in method. The English colonies were not wanting in the manlyxspirit which assumes readily the tasks of manhood. It was because they were so manly in outlook that they resented with enduring bitterness the attempt to treat them as wayward and, in the end, as malignant children.
• In defying George I I I they assumed burdens and endured losses much heavier than any which would have been involved in obedience. After the American Revolution Britain was left with dependent states for the most part alien from her in blood and tradition and, in the ultimate analysis, held by the power of the sword. There was the germ of the present Indian Empire; there were a few weak and scattered colonies. The British Empire as to-day we know it was still to create and it was to be created in the light of the colossal failure which had led to the republic of the United States.
For a long time after this first disaster no urgent problem existed in regard to the sharing of common burdens. Outside of the United Kingdom there were not, for some scores of years, any British peoples who really mattered. Shattered was that earlier ideal of overseas states peopled l•y Britons who treasured as their own the glories of an Imperial England, who were at home in lands widely scattered, but who never renounced the proud British citizenship with memories reaching back into a remote past. Probably when the American colonies broke away there were not a quarter of a million people of British origin living outside of the British Isles. There was no hope that these few people could share the burdens of an imperial state. They were themselves the burden. For a hundred years after the American Revolution, Canada was protected almost wholly at the expense of the British government. The colonies which remained to Britain were in truth what George III had desired the lost colonies to be, children to be protected by the parent and to give in return affection, trust, and obedience. Their political education could begin only when they were populous enough to take care of themselves.
For half a century after the American Revolution a majority of the people of Canada were of French origin with no tradition of British self-government. The British element, however, multiplied. Perhaps fifty or sixty thousand people, chiefly of English, rather than of Irish or Scottish, origin, driven out from the young republics, because of their loyalty to their king, took refuge in Canada. They were reinforced later by Irish and Scottish elements. While Canada was poor, weak in numbers, without importance compared with the wealth and power of the British Isles, it was easy to adhere to the view of parent and child. What the parent chiefly owed to the daughter state was protection, the protection of the strong for the weak. It was, of course, desirable that the people of the colony should, as far as possible, control their own local affairs. Final authority rested, however, with the mother country. It sent out a governor who was intended really to govern. Each colony had its little legislature, but this ought not to• take itself too seriously. It could make laws and vote ß money. Over its doings, even in respect to these things, the governor kept a watchful eye and could at any time block action by refusing his consent to measures proposed. The legislature must do nothing that touched upon more than the internal interests of the colony and the judge of the imp/)rt of its actions was to be the governor. It was for him to appoint to office and to dismiss from office. He had no ministers in any true sense of the word.
There was no colonial cabinet which he must consult. He took advice from whom he would. Why should he not, since
Great Britain was responsible for the well-being of the colony and pledged to protect it from all danger? Of partnership on the part of the colony with Great Britain there was no thought. The strong parent protected a weak child. By 1850, however, Canada had between three and four million people, a larger population than that of the American colonies at the time of the Revolution. By 1850, too, it had been established, and not without strife and bloodshed, that the legislature Fear of dictation from the great republic was not, of course, the only motive which led the scattered colonies to think of union. They needed union to save them from obscurity and isolation. Thus it came about that just at the time in 1864 when the North was planning the supreme effort to end the civil war, when Sherman was making his desolating march from Atlanta[ to the sea, and Grant was nerving .himself for the last heavy blows which brought in the end the unconditional surrender of Lee, delegates from the British provinces were in conference at Quebec on the problem of union. Their conference was fruitful, and out of it came, in 1867, the federation since known as What, we may again ask, was to be the relation of•a selfreliant and proud nation in America to a self-reliant and proud nation in Europe, both of them owning allegiance to the same sovereign? It could not remain that of colony and mother country. The Canadian soldier in Flanders or France had no feeling that he was protected by a powerful mother land, the feeling which would have expressed the truth in regard to the Canada of an earlier period. Even so recently as in the South African war, though Canadian regiments had served in the British army, they had been paid not by Canada but by Great Britain. Now, in the Great War, Canada, for the first time, paid her own way as Britain and France paid their own way. For the first time the Canadian people subscribed for great loans to their own government to carry on the war. Hitherto a debtor nation, Canada became in part a creditor nation. She made vast quantities of munitions of war. Hitherto her manufacturers had not ventured upon some of the more delicate work in, for instance, steel, but now they made complex and difficult products. The young nation was showing itself competent. Its soldiers proved equal to the best. The officers, most of them civilians bef•ore the war, quickly acquired skill and enterprise in making war. What was to be the political expression of this national vitality? •
III. CHANGES IN THE BRITISH CABINET SYSTEM
The Great War tested the machinery of all governments. In no very long time Russia broke down completely and fell into anarchy. So also, in measure which we hardly yet understand, collapsed in succession Bulgaria, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and finally Germany. These countries were not merely defeated. In earlier wars nations have been defeated with no striking changes in the fabric of their governments. The strain, however, of this war, on a scale unique in human history, involved the break-up of many states, the fall of dynasties, the total collapse of political institutions. That the states which proved so stable as to win unexampled victory should yet change was to be expected, and A cabinet of five may be as inefficient as a/:abinet of a score if the right men are not found to serve. Granted the insight and driving power of genius, a cabinet of one might be better than a cabinet of six. Napoleon Bonaparte was his own cabinet. There was no magic in a small cabinet. Everything depended upon the members. Not only was it important that they should be able; it was also necessary that they should be free from other cares.
The War Cabinet was in practically continuous session. The members remained in London. They denied themselves pleasant, leisurely week-ends in the country. Sometimes meetings were held twice daily; always they were held once, except on Sunday. Lord Curzon said on June 19, 1918,-that in four hundred and seventy-four days there had been five hundred and fifty-five meetings; that two rules were steadily kept in view, one to summon to the Cabinet the ministers, the generals, admirals and other experts who could give desired information and advice, the other to postpone nothing until to-morrow which could be decided to-day. July, the British had in France 700 more guns than they had when the offensive began. They had to reduce their transport at home by sending across the Channel 12,000 railway wagons wi,th the •needed locomotives. They were forced to take 54,000 men from the railways, and 80,000 from the mines for military purposes. Yet production increased, and during the year the British people paid in taxes the vast sum of about $4,500,000,000.
All this shows that the War Cabinet directed British energies with effect. There were, however, special difficulties in ruling through this small body. Its members had to summon experts in every branch of effort and these consultations involved sometimes more advisers than those in the old Cabinet.
The men wholly detached from executive duties could not always determine the lines of policy as well as could those actually at the head of departments and, since these were not deliberating together, 
